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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL BEIRNE, individually, on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
and as representatives of other
aggrieved employees,

Plaintiff;

vs.

TREPCO IMPORTS &
DISTRIBUTION ltd. company; and
DOES 1 through 250, inclusive;

Defendants.

Case No.: 5:19-cv-00170-CAC-KKx

The Honorable Cormac J. Carney
CLASS ACTION

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES**

Date: November 16, 2020

Time: 1:30 p.m

Ctrm: 9B

Action Filed: 11/13/18

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT ON the date that on November 16, 2020, at 1:30p.m. in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Courtroom 7C, before District Judge Cormac J. Carney, Plaintiff Daniel Beirne (Plaintiff) will move for final approval of the proposed Class Settlement with Defendant Trepcos Imports & Distribution Ltd. (“Defendant”). This motion is unopposed as based on the Class Action Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) between the parties, which was filed in connection with the Motion for Preliminary Approval.

The motion will be based on this Notice of Motion and the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith, the Declaration of Brent Buchsbaum, the Declaration of Daniel Beirne and attached exhibits, the argument of counsel and upon such other material contained in the file and pleadings of this action.

Respectfully Submitted,

Dated: October 26, 2020

LAW OFFICES OF BUCHSBAUM & HAAG
A Limited Liability Partnership

By: /s/ Brent S. Buchsbaum
Brent Buchsbaum, Attorney for Plaintiffs

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff seeks final approval of a \$310,000 class action settlement that provides significant monetary relief for 328 Class Members. The key terms of the Joint Stipulation of Class and Representative Action Settlement¹ are as follows:

- (1) Settlement Class Members: all current and/or former non-exempt employees that worked for Trepco in hourly positions between November 13, 2015 , and through the date of preliminary approval (July 28, 2020) (the “Class Period”), excluding any person who opts-out.
- (2) A Gross Fund Value of \$310,000 that includes:
 - (a) The Net Fund Value (i.e., the Gross Fund Value minus Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, payroll (employee only) taxes, the Claims Administration Fee, the LWDA Payment, and the Class Representative Service Awards).
 - (b) \$77,500 in Attorneys’ Fees (25% of the gross settlement) and \$9,545 in actual costs to Class Counsel.
 - (c) \$7,000 Claims Administration Fee to Claims Administrator, Simpluris.
 - (d) \$10,000 PAGA payment pursuant to Private Attorneys General Act (75% of which, or \$7,500, goes to the LWDA, and the remaining 25%, or \$2,500, going to the Net Fund).
 - (e) \$5,000 Service Award to the class representative.

¹ Hereinafter, “Settlement Agreement” or “Settlement.” Unless indicated otherwise, capitalized terms used herein have the same meaning as those defined by the Settlement Agreement.

As of today's date, there are zero objections to the settlement and only one "opt out." Moreover, through skip tracing efforts, the claims administrator was able to deliver the notices to all the putative class members. See Butler Declaration, at ¶¶9-11.

The Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate—and meets approval under Federal law. Accordingly Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

A. Plaintiff Filed a Putative Class Action Alleging Labor Code Violations

On November 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint in the San Bernardino County Superior Court for the following causes of action: (1) failure to pay all wages, including minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime, including overtime at the proper regular rate; (3) failure to provide required rest break premiums; (4) failure to pay required meal period premiums; (5) failure to pay wages due at termination; and (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiff sought to recover back wages, premiums, and civil penalties for Class Members.² (Buchsbaum Decl. ¶9).

On January 23, 2019, the Defendant removed the case to Federal Court, asserting a general denial and affirmative defenses. On February 28, 2019, the court granted the parties' joint stipulation to submit the case to mediation. On January 31, 2020, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint that related to additional civil penalties and additional allegations regarding regular rate underpayments for overtime. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶10).

² The complaint also includes causes of action for unfair competition (B&P Code § 17200), and enforcement of PAGA (Cal. Lab. Code § 2698 et seq.).

1 This proposed settlement came to fruition only after substantial legal
2 research and analysis, extensive investigation, the exchange and analysis of a
3 significant amount of relevant data, and extensive arm's-length settlement
4 negotiations at a private mediation with Steve Serratore, an experienced and well-
5 regarded wage and hour class action mediator. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶11).

6 As stated, if the Settlement is approved, Defendants will pay a Common
7 Fund settlement of \$310,000. After deductions for court-approved incentive
8 payments to the named Plaintiffs, settlement administration costs, attorneys' fees
9 and costs, and payment to the Labor & Workforce Development Agency
10 ("LWDA") for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General
11 Act ("PAGA"), the Net Common Fund shall be distributed to all Settlement Class
12 members, based on their number of workweeks during the relevant time periods.
13 (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶12).

14 This settlement provides a substantial recovery on Defendant's alleged
15 wage and hour violations and disputed derivative penalty claims. Based on the
16 litigation risks involved, Plaintiffs submit that the proposed settlement is well
17 within the range of reasonableness required for approval. Moreover, the settlement
18 agreement and notice distribution plan are the products of an informed and
19 thoroughly-vetted analysis of the claims and defenses, as well as the likelihood of
20 obtaining class certification, and arm's-length settlement negotiations by
21 experienced employment counsel. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶13).

22 **III. LEGAL CLAIMS**

23 **A. Unpaid Overtime / Regular Rate Miscalculation**

24 Plaintiffs posited several theories of Class liability against Defendant in
25 support of his alleged claims. One of the primary claims was that the Defendant
26 miscalculated the regular rate for overtime purpose. Specifically, the Defendant
27 paid non-exempt employees a production bonus for returning containers to the
28

1 yard. We contended that these were non-discretionary bonuses, but they were not
2 calculated as part of the regular rate. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶14).

3 This methodological error led, in plaintiffs' counsel's view, to relatively
4 modest underpayments of overtime, which potentially triggered waiting time
5 penalties under Labor Code §203 with regard to former employees. The
6 Defendant characterized the payments as discretionary, so this created some
7 uncertainty over the issue of waiting time penalties, which are subject to a good
8 faith dispute defense. *See Cal. Code Regs. § 13520* (good-faith dispute exists to a
9 claim for waiting time penalties "when an employer presents a defense, based in
10 law or fact which, if successful, would preclude any recovery on the part of the
11 employee. The fact that a defense is ultimately unsuccessful will not preclude a
12 finding that a good faith dispute did exist."); *see also Kao v. Joy Holiday* (2017)
13 Cal.App.5th 947 (precluding waiting time penalties where good-faith dispute
14 existed over entitlement to wages, and holding that "[w]aiting time penalties are
15 properly limited to the *uncontested* wages due at the time of Kao's termination")
16 (emphasis added). Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs' meal and rest period
17 claims cannot support a claim for waiting time penalties under Labor Code
18 Section 203 after the California Supreme Court's decision in *Kirby v. Immoos*
19 *Fire Protection* (2012) 53 Cal.App4th 1244, which held that meal and rest period
20 claims are not actions for the "nonpayment of wages." Indeed, the California
21 Court of Appeal held last year that "[f]ollowing *Kirby*, section 226.7 cannot
22 support a section 203 penalty because [§203b] tethers the waiting time penalty to a
23 separate action for wages." *Ling v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro* 245 Cal.App.4th
24 1242, 1261 (2016).

25 The average waiting time penalty, based on average hourly earnings of class
26 members of \$14.23 per hour, was approximately \$3,415. We believe there were
27 approximately 50 former employees who worked for this bonus and worked
28

overtime, leading to potential exposure of \$170,760. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶16).

B. Meal and Rest Period Premiums

The second primary claim was whether the drivers were relieved of all duty for the purposes of rest and meal periods. Driver time records that we reviewed showed frequent instances of work periods exceeding 10 hours with no indication of any meal period. The Defendant contended that it was up to the driver to document meal periods and that employees had acknowledged this rule by signing acknowledgements. The Defendant further contended that if drivers skipped meal periods or rest periods it was simply a matter of waiver, and not because there was no opportunity to take a rest or meal period. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶17).

Plaintiff contended that the scheduling placed intense coercive pressure to skip breaks because the delivery timelines were very tight. However, there was some concern that this testimony would end up being anecdotal and that it may be difficult to certify the class, since there were policies in effect that provided for meal and rest periods at appropriate intervals. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶18).

There were 107,321 work shifts in the class period, and with an approximate 20% violation rate for either rest or meal, the exposure was approximately \$305,435. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶19).

C. Paystub Claims

The paystub claim was premised on the Defendant including the wrong overtime rate in the paystub by failing to consider the true regular rate of the earnings. Moreover, the paystubs failed to accurately indicate meal and rest period premiums that were due. However, around the filing of this case, the Court of Appeals published *Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc.* (2018) Cal.App.5th 1308, which essentially eliminates the possibility of purely derivative paystub claims, absent some contrary ruling by the California Supreme Court. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶20).

1 **D. PAGA CLAIMS**

2 The PAGA claims were derivative of the claims described above, which in
3 our view made it likely that the court would likely substantially reduce the amount
4 of any civil penalty that was already the subject of a statutory violation. There
5 was also the question of whether a court would permit “stacking” of civil penalties
6 that derive from the same underlying wrong, making calculation of a true PAGA
7 exposure very difficult. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶21).

8 Defendants also deny liability under PAGA because they contend Plaintiffs'
9 underlying claims are meritless. *See, e.g., Price v Starbucks Corp.* (2016) 192
10 Cal.App. 4th 1136, 1147 (2011) (“Because the underlying causes of action fail, the
11 derivative UCL and PAGA claims also fail.”). Defendants further contend that
12 even if liability were established, this Court would utilize its discretion to severely
13 reduce any PAGA penalties awarded. *See Labor Code §2699(e)(2)* (granting
14 courts discretion to award “a lesser amount” than the full penalty “based on the
15 facts and circumstances of the particular case”); *see also Thurman v. Bayshore*
16 *Transit Management, Inc.* 203 Cal.App. 4th 1112, 1135 (2012). (affirming
17 reduction of PAGA penalties); *Fleming v. Covidien, Inc.* 2011 WL
18 7563047 (reducing PAGA penalties from \$2.8 million to \$500,000).

19 There were 10,732 pay periods in the PAGA period, and with a 20%
20 approximate violation rate revealed by the records, exposure was \$214,640, but
21 this was subject to significant reduction given the statutory fees already at play for
22 the same violations. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶22).

23 **IV. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS PRELIMINARY APPROVAL**

24 **A. The Settlement is Fair, Adequate and Reasonable**

25 To receive judicial approval, a proposed **class action** settlement must be
26 “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” *See Fed. Rule of Civil Proc. 23(e)(2)*. In making
27 this determination, this Court may consider the following factors: (1) the strength
28

1 of the plaintiff's case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of
2 further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout trial;
3 (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the
4 stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence
5 of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the
6 proposed settlement (which is to be evaluated at the final approval hearing, after
7 the class members have received notice). *See Rodriguez v. West Publishing*
8 *Corp.*, 563 F.3d 948, 963 (9th Cir. 2003) Plaintiffs address each relevant factor
9 below.

10 **1. The Strength of the Case**

11 Although he steadfastly maintains that his claims are meritorious, Plaintiff
12 acknowledges that Defendants possessed several defenses to both liability and
13 class certification, such that prevailing on either was uncertain. (See Buchsbaum
14 Decl., ¶23). As explained earlier in this brief, Defendant presented multiple
15 defenses to each of Plaintiffs' underlying claims, both on the merits and with
16 respect to class certification. As a result, Plaintiff's ability to certify and prevail on
17 his claims was far from guaranteed. "In most situations, unless the settlement is
18 clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are preferable to lengthy and
19 expensive litigation with uncertain results." *National Rural Tele. Coop. v.*
20 *DIRECTTV, Inc.* 221 F.R.D 523, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (internal quotations
21 omitted). Thus, this factor supports preliminary approval.

22 **2. Risk, Expense, and Complexity of Further Litigation**

23 The parties engaged in a significant amount of investigation, informal
24 discovery, and class-wide data analysis, and also reviewed a substantial number of
25 payroll records, multiple versions of employee handbooks. (See Buchsbaum
26 Decl., ¶24). Defendant may have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based on
27 several of the issues. As a result, the parties would incur considerably more
28

1 attorneys' fees and costs through trial. This settlement avoids those risks and the
2 accompanying expense. See *In re Portal Software, Inc.* 2007 WL 4171201 at * 3
3 (N.D. Cal. November 26, 2017) (noting that the “inherent risks of proceeding to
4 summary judgment, trial and appeal also support the settlement”). Thus, this factor
5 favors preliminary approval.

6 **3. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status**

7 Plaintiffs had not yet filed their motion for class certification when the
8 parties reached the proposed settlement. (Buchsbaum Decl., ¶25). Absent
9 settlement, there was a risk that there would not be a certified class at the time of
10 trial, and that the putative class members would not recover anything. *Id.* As
11 discussed herein, Plaintiffs believe there was substantial risk with certifying all of
12 the proposed classes. Thus, this factor also supports preliminary approval.

13 **4. Settlement Amount Provides Realistic Value for Claims**

14 This proposed settlement provides a substantial monetary recovery for
15 Settlement Class members in face of disputed claims. As detailed, Plaintiffs
16 believe this settlement represents a good recovery in light of the substantial risks
17 that the key claims were barred by federal preemption.

18 **A. Waiting Time Penalties**

19 There were approximately 50 former drivers that we believe were
20 underpaid in at least one pay period as a result of the regular rate
21 misclassification, which given a 14.23 average hourly wage, amounts to a
22 waiting time penalty of \$170,760. However, as indicated, this was likely an “all
23 or nothing” penalty, since it was subject to a good faith defense.

24 **B. Meal and Rest Periods**

25 Based on the number of workweeks we extrapolated from the records, and
26 given a 20% violation rate, the rest and meal period premium liability amounted
27 to approximately \$305,405. However, we viewed the likely exposure of being
28

1 much lower based on the defenses asserted and the complications of getting a
2 class certified based on anecdotal testimony and no systematic defect in the meal
3 period policy. We understood that some drivers would indicate that they did get
4 meal and rest periods routinely, which created significant certification risks as
5 well.

6 **C. Overtime Underpayment**

7 The amount of the overtime underpayment based on the regular rate
8 miscalculation was very modest, amounting to a few dollars for each pay period.
9 Based on the size of the class, and our approximation of the number of shifts that
10 non-discretionary bonus and overtime coincided, we believe the exposure was no
11 more than \$20,000.

12 **D. Paystub Violations**

13 Based on *Maldonado, supra*, the paystub claim was very weak, and the
14 exposure was in all likelihood not going to be present at trial.

15 **E. PAGA Claims**

16 We believe there were approximately 10,732 pay periods within the PAGA
17 period, and at \$100 per pay period based on these derivative claims, the exposure
18 (based on 20% violation rate) might have amounted to \$214,640. We viewed the
19 PAGA claims as largely duplicative of the other claims, and, as discussed above,
20 highly vulnerable to a reduction.

21 In total then, we viewed the gross exposure at approximately \$715,000.
22 The settlement of \$300,000, based on the merits risks associated with each of
23 these claims, as well as the certification risks, is well within the reasonable range
24 of settlement.

25 **5. Discovery Completed and the Status of Proceedings**

26 The parties engaged in a significant amount of investigation, informal class-
27 wide discovery, and analysis prior to reaching the proposed
28

1 settlement. (*See* Buchsbaum Decl., ¶32). As stated, Defendants provided time and
2 pay records, and provided detailed data regarding total Settlement Class members,
3 pay period information, average hourly rates, and other relevant data for the
4 class. *Id.* It was only after this exchange of data and information that the parties
5 participated in a full-day mediation and ultimately reached the proposed
6 settlement by way of a mediated settlement. *Id.* Thus, this factor
7 supports preliminary approval.

8 **6. The Experience and Views of Counsel**

9 “Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts
10 to produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party's expected outcome in
11 litigation.” *In re Pacific Enterprises Sec. Litig.*, 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995).
12 Here, Plaintiffs are represented by experienced wage and hour class action counsel
13 who collectively have more than two decades of wage and
14 hour class action experience, and who have successfully served as lead counsel in
15 certifying and settling numerous class actions both in the federal and state courts
16 of California. (*See* Buchsbaum Decl., ¶¶ 3-7); This factor supports preliminary
17 approval. *See, e.g., Gribble v. Cool Transports* 2008 WL 5281665 *9 (C.D. Cal.
18 December 15, 2008 (“Great weight is accorded to the recommendation of counsel,
19 who are most closely acquainted with the facts of the underlying litigation.”))

20 **B. The Final Approval Standard Is Met**

21 The Court can grant final approval of the settlement and direct that notice
22 be given if the proposed settlement: (1) falls within the range of possible approval;
23 (2) appears to be the product of serious, informed, and non-collusive negotiations;
24 and (3) has no obvious deficiencies. *See Manual for Complex Litigation* (3d ed.
25 1995) at § 30.41; Newberg et al., *Newberg on Class Actions* (4th ed. 2013) at §
26 11:24-25. These criteria are met here.

27 **1. The Settlement is Within the Range of Possible Approval**

28

1 The proposed settlement reflects a substantial recovery in light of real
2 litigation risks on both merits and certification. Plaintiffs submit that the proposed
3 settlement is within the range of possible approval, such that notice should be
4 provided to the Settlement Class so that they can consider the settlement. The
5 Court will have the opportunity to again assess the reasonableness of the
6 settlement after the Settlement Classes have had the opportunity to opt-out or
7 object.

8 **2. The Settlement Resulted from Arm's-Length Negotiations**

9 This proposed settlement is the result of extensive arm's-length negotiations
10 by counsel and is, therefore, entitled to an initial presumption of fairness. *See In*
11 *re First Capital Holdings Corp.* 1992 WL 22631 at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 10,
12 1992) (“Approval of the settlement is discretionary with the court, but there is
13 typically an initial presumption of fairness where the settlement was negotiated at
14 arm's length.”).

15 As discussed above, Plaintiffs thoroughly vetted the claims at issue and
16 conducted factual investigation and extensive legal research and
17 analysis. *See* Buchsbaum Decl., ¶35. The parties reached this settlement only after
18 mediating with Steve Serratore, a well-respected mediator with extensive
19 experience in mediating wage and hour class actions. *Id.* The parties each supplied
20 Mr. Serratore with detailed mediation briefs outlining their views of the strengths
21 and weaknesses of each claim and defense. *Id.* As noted, the parties mutually
22 accepted Mr. Serratore’s mediated proposal, which reflected what the mediator
23 determined to be the fair settlement value of the case. *Id.* Even after the parties
24 had come to an initial agreement, both sides continued to negotiate the finer points
25 of the proposed settlement for several months while drafting the long-form
26 settlement agreement. *Id.*

27 **3. The Settlement is Devoid of Obvious Deficiencies**

28

1 If the Court approves this settlement, Defendants will pay a Common Fund
2 of \$310,000. Moreover, no Settlement Class member will be required to submit a
3 claim form to receive his or her Settlement payment. The principal terms of the
4 proposed settlement agreement are summarized below:

5 Common Fund:	\$310,000
6 Minus Court-approved attorney's fees:	\$77,500
7 Minus Court-approved costs:	\$9,545
8 Minus Court-approved incentive payments:	\$5,000
9 Minus PAGA payment to LWDA:	\$7,500
10 Minus settlement administration costs:	\$7,000
11 Net Common Fund:	\$203,455

12 The payments will be made to class members based on their proportionate
13 number of workweeks during the class period. *See* Settlement, ¶53

14 The average payment to Settlement Class members under this proposed
15 settlement is \$618.90 and the highest payment would be \$2,532.96. *See* Butler
16 Decl., ¶12. Moreover, this average recovery per class member is on par with, and
17 exceeds, other wage and hour class action settlements involving non-exempt
18 employees alleging similar claims.

19 Settlement Class members who do not opt-out of the Settlement will be
20 bound by the Settlement's terms, and will release the Releasees from all California
21 claims that are alleged in, or that reasonably could have arisen based on the facts
22 alleged in the Complaint. *See* Settlement, ¶31. The parties have agreed to
23 designate a total \$10,000 of the Common Fund for PAGA penalties, seventy-five
24 percent (75%) of which will go to the LWDA, which is appropriate. *See, e.g., Chu*
25 *v. Wells Fargo Investments, Inc.* 2011 WL 672645 at * 1 (N.D. Cal. February 16,
26 2011 (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$6.9 million
27 common-fund settlement); *Lazarin v. Pro Unlimited, Inc.* 2013 WL 3541217
28

(N.D Cal. July 11, 2013) (approving PAGA payment of \$7,500 to LWDA out of \$1.25 million common-fund settlement).

4. The Attorney Fee Request and Incentive are Reasonable.

The proposed incentive payment to Plaintiff of \$5,000 is also reasonable. See Beirne Declaration and Buchsbaum Decl., at ¶¶52-59.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides that, [i]n a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement. “Attorney’s fees provisions included in a proposed class action agreement are, like every other aspect of such agreement, subject to a determination whether the settlement is “fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable.” *Staton v. Boeng Co.* 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003).

In “common fund” cases, a “litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole. *Id.*, at 967 (*quoting *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert* 444 US 472, 478 (1980). To determine the amount of the attorney’s fees to be drawn from the fund, the district court may utilize the “percentage method,” which awards the attorneys a percentage of the fund. *Id.* The 9th Circuit’s “benchmark” for attorney’s fees in common fund class action is 25% of the common fund. Selection of the benchmark, however, must be supported by findings that take into account all of the circumstances of the case. See *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002). Circumstances include (1) the results achieved; (2) the risks of litigation; (3) whether there are benefits to the class beyond the immediate generation of a cash fund; (4) whether the percentage rate is at or above the market rate; (5) the contingent nature of the representation and the opportunity cost of bringing the suit; (6) a loadstar cross-check; and (7) reactions from the class. *Id.*, at 1048-1052.

Here, Plaintiff's counsel took this case on a contingency, with all the associated risk that it entails, and an obligation to advance, at his own risk, the costs for the case. Plaintiff's Counsel's request for attorney's fees not to exceed \$77,500 (25% of gross settlement) for all past and future attorney's fees necessary to prosecute, settle, and administer the litigation and this proposed Settlement, and for verified litigation costs not to exceed \$9,545. See *In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig.* 654 F.3d 935, 942. (in the Ninth Circuit, a 25% award is the "benchmark" attorneys' fee award). The 25% is also supported by plaintiff's counsel's loadstar, without any multiplier for contingent risk. See Buchsbaum Decl. ¶¶45-49. The 25% is at or below the going rate in Los Angeles County for contingency wage and hour cases, and the results to the class, which include over \$600 for each class member, and no objections to the settlement, warrant the 25% benchmark fee as well. Plaintiff's counsel is also seeking reimbursement for verified and necessary costs amounting to \$9,545, which include the mediation fee (\$7,500), the complex filing and serve costs (\$1,590) and \$455 in additional filing and copying costs. See Buchsbaum Declaration at ¶¶45-49. Because the proposed settlement is devoid of obvious deficiencies, this final factor also supports preliminary approval.

V. THE SETTLEMENT MERITS CERTIFICATION

A. Rule 23(a)(1) Numerosity Is Satisfied

Numerosity is satisfied because there are 328 current and former non-exempt employees in the proposed Settlement Class. See Settlement at ¶ 16; see also *Ikonen v. Hartz Mountain Corp.* 122 F.R.D 258, 262 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that classes of 40 or more members satisfy numerosity).

B. Rule 23(a)(2) Commonality Is Satisfied

The Settlement Class satisfies commonality because there are common questions of fact and law arising from Plaintiffs' and the proposed Settlement

1 Class' employment with Defendants, such as Defendant's allegedly improper
2 regular rate miscalculations, meal and rest period policies and defects with
3 maintaining accurate paystubs -- all of which Plaintiffs contends arise from a
4 common core of facts, as discussed above. See Beirne Declaration.

5 **C. Rule 23(a)(3) Typicality Is Satisfied**

6 According to the Ninth Circuit, "[u]nder [Rule 23(a)(3)'s] permissive
7 standards, representative claims are 'typical' if they are reasonably co-extensive
8 with those of absent class members." See *Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.* 150 F.3d
9 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998) . Here, Plaintiff's claims are typical of those held by
10 other non-exempt employees. Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants as hourly
11 non-exempt employees during the relevant time periods. Plaintiffs were subject to
12 Defendants' challenged regular rate miscalculations, meal and rest period policies,
13 as well as paystub irregularities. *Id.* Because the Settlement Class consists only of
14 other non-exempt employees, and because Plaintiffs' claims stem from
15 Defendants' wage and hour policies and practices, typicality is satisfied.

16 **D. Rule 23(a)(4) Adequacy Is Satisfied**

17 Plaintiff is also adequate as a class representative under Rule 23(a)(4). To
18 satisfy this requirement, Plaintiffs and their counsel must not have conflicts of
19 interest with the proposed classes, and must vigorously prosecute the action on
20 behalf of the classes. *Hanlon, supra*, 150 F.3d at 1020. Here, there is no conflict
21 of interest between Plaintiff and the proposed Settlement Class. As a non-exempt
22 employees, Plaintiff pressed forward claims for unpaid wages, unpaid premium
23 wage, and related penalties resulting from Defendants' allegedly unlawful wage
24 and hour policies and practices on behalf of other non-exempt employees. As
25 detailed above, the proposed settlement reflects a substantial recovery of
26 Settlement Class members' alleged damages. Given the relatively small amounts at
27 issue per employee, Plaintiff asserts that it is unlikely that any class member,
28

1 especially a current employee, would have pursued these claims against Defendant
2 individually. *See, e.g., Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc.* 716 F3d 510, 515 (9th Cir.
3 2013) (“In light of the small size of the putative class members' potential
4 individual monetary recovery, class certification may be the only feasible means
5 for them to adjudicate their claims. Thus, class certification is also the superior
6 method of adjudication.”). Finally, Plaintiff’s counsel diligently litigated this case,
7 undertook an extensive analysis of the claims and potential damages, and there are
8 no conflicts with the Settlement Class members. As set forth in the concurrently
9 filed declarations of Plaintiffs' counsel, Plaintiffs' counsel are adequate to
10 represent the proposed Settlement Class given their qualifications, skills, and
11 experience.

12 **E. Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance Is Satisfied**

13 Predominance tests “whether the proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive
14 to warrant adjudication by [class action] representation.” *See Amchem v.*
15 *Windsor*, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1991). Because Plaintiffs seek certification for
16 settlement purposes, trial manageability need not be considered. *Id.*, at 620. As all
17 Settlement Class members were allegedly deprived of wages due to Defendants'
18 allegedly unlawful regular rate miscalculation, and meal and rest period policies
19 and practices, the Settlement Class is “sufficiently cohesive” since a “common
20 nucleus of facts” and “potential legal remedies” dominate. *See Hanlon, supra*,
21 150 F.3d at 1022. *See Buchsbaum Decl.*,

22 **VI. THE PROPOSED NOTICE PROCESS SATISFIES DUE PROCESS**

23 Due process requires that notice be provided by the best reasonable method
24 available. *See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline* 417 US 156 (1974). Notice is
25 satisfactory if it “generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail
26 to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be
27
28

1 heard.” See *Churchill Vill., LLC v. Gen Electric*, 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir.
2 2004).

3 Simpluris was appointed by the Court as Settlement Administrator to
4 administer the Settlement in accordance with the terms of the Joint Stipulation
5 and Class Action Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement”). Simpluris has been
6 responsible, among other things, for: (a) printing and mailing the Notice of
7 Proposed Class Action Settlement and Hearing Date for Court Approval, Share
8 Form and Challenge Form (“Notice Packet”); (b) receiving undeliverable Notice
9 Packets; (c) receiving and requests for exclusion; (d) and answering questions
10 from Class Members. If the Court grants final approval of the Settlement,
11 Simpluris will be responsible, among other things, for: (e) calculating individual
12 Settlement payments, distributing funds, and tax-reporting following final
13 approval; (f) mailing Settlement checks; (g) and for such other tasks as the
14 Parties mutually agree or the Court orders Simpluris to perform. Butler Decl.,
15 ¶3.

16 **TOLL FREE TELEPHONE HELPLINE**

17 A toll-free telephone number was included in the Class Notice for the
18 purpose of allowing the Class Members to call Simpluris and to make inquiries
19 regarding the Settlement. The system is accessible 24 hours a day, 7 days a
20 week, and will remain in operation throughout the settlement process. Callers
21 have the option to speak with a live call center representative during normal
22 business hours or to leave a message and receive a return call during non-
23 business hours. The toll-free telephone number included in the Class Notice
24 was 1-888-369-3780. See Butler Decl., at ¶4

25 **NOTIFICATION TO THE CLASS**

26 On July 29, 2020, Simpluris received the Court-approved Notice Packet
27 from Plaintiffs’ Counsel. The Notice Packet advised Class Members of their
28 right to opt out from the Settlement, object to the Settlement, or do nothing, and
the implications of each such action. The Notice Packet advised Class Members

1 of applicable deadlines and other events, including the Final Approval Hearing,
2 and how Class Members could obtain additional information. Butler Decl., ¶5.

3 On August 18, 2020, Counsel for Defendant provided Simpluris with a
4 mailing list containing the name, last known address, Social Security Number,
5 and number of weeks worked during the Class Period for the Class Members.
6 The Class List contained data for 329 unique Class Members. Butler Decl., at
7 ¶6.

8 The mailing addresses contained in the Class List were processed and
9 updated utilizing the National Change of Address Database (“NCOA”)
10 maintained by the U.S. Postal Service. The NCOA contains changes of address
11 filed with the U.S. Postal Service. In the event that any individual had filed a
12 U.S. Postal Service change of address request, the address listed with the NCOA
13 was utilized in connection with the mailing of the Notice Packets. Butler Decl.,
14 ¶7.

15 On September 8, 2020, after updating the mailing addresses through the
16 NCOA, Notice Packets were mailed via First Class Mail to 329 Class Members
17 contained in the Class List. Butler Decl., ¶8.

18 As of the date of this declaration, 34 Notice Packets were returned by the
19 post office. For those without a forwarding address, Simpluris performed an
20 advanced address search (i.e. skip trace) on all of these addresses by using
21 Accurant, a reputable research tool owned by Lexis-Nexis. Simpluris used the
22 Class Member’s name, previous address and Social Security number to locate a
23 more current address. Thirty-four (34) Notice Packets were re-mailed to either a
24 newfound address, with forwarding addresses provided by the United States Postal
25 Service or at the request of the Class Member. Ultimately 0 Notice Packets were
26 undeliverable. Butler Decl., ¶9.

27 **EXCLUSIONS AND OBJECTIONS**

28 As of the date of this declaration, Simpluris received 1 requests for

1 exclusion from the Settlement. Butler Decl., ¶10.

2 As of the date of this declaration, Simpluris has not received any
3 objections. Butler Decl., at ¶11.

4 As of the date of this declaration, the *highest* Settlement Share to be paid is
5 approximately \$2,532.96 and the *average* Settlement Share to be paid is
6 approximately \$618.90. These amounts are not final since timely responses can
7 be received several days after the November 7, 2020 postmark deadline. Butler
8 Decl., ¶12

9 ADMINISTRATION COSTS


10 Simpluris' total costs for services in connection with the administration of
11 this Settlement, including fees incurred and anticipated future costs for
12 completion of the administration, are \$7,000.00. Simpluris' work in connection
13 with this matter will continue with the calculation of the Settlement checks,
14 issuance and mailing of those Settlement checks, etc., and to do the necessary tax
15 reporting on such payments. Butler Decl., at ¶13.

16 VII. CONCLUSION

17 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully request that the Court
18 grant final approval of this class, collective, and representative action settlement.
19

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21
22 Dated: October 26, 2020

LAW OFFICES OF BUCHSBAUM & HAAG
A Limited Liability Partnership

23
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25 By: 
26 Brent Buchsbaum, Attorney for Plaintiffs
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